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Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of “substantive due 
process” by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due 
process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious 
defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who 
suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many 
minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a 
tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a 
systematic bias; and they might have joined a cascade. An alternative defense sees due 
process traditionalism as a second-best substitute for two preferable alternatives: a 
purely procedural approach to the due process clause, and an approach that gives 
legislatures the benefit of every reasonable doubt. But it is not clear that in these 
domains, the first-best approaches are especially attractive; and even if they are, the 
second-best may be an unacceptably crude substitute. The most plausible defense of due 
process traditionalism operates on rule-consequentialist grounds, with the suggestion 
that even if traditions are not great, they are often good, and judges do best if they defer 
to traditions rather than attempting to specify the content of “liberty” on their own. But 
the rule-consequentialist defense depends on controversial and probably false 
assumptions about the likely goodness of traditions and the institutional incapacities of 
judges. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
  The Supreme Court and individual justices have often suggested that under the 
Due Process Clause, rights qualify as such only if they can claim firm roots in 
longstanding traditions.
1 In Washington v. Glucksberg,
2 for example, the Court appeared 
to settle on a kind of due process traditionalism, captured in the view that longstanding 
cultural understandings are both necessary and sufficient for the substantive protection of 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago.  Thanks to Adrian Vermeule for valuable comments and to Miriam Seifter for 
excellent suggestions and research assistance. 
1See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 707 (1997); Michael G. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989); 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
2 521 U.S. 707 (1997). 2 
rights under the due process clause. On this view, no interest qualifies for protection 
under that clause if it lacks historical credentials; and interests that can claim such 
credentials deserve protection for that very reason. 
Due process traditionalism is hardly novel. It can itself claim firm roots in 
American traditions. In his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York,
3 Justice Holmes 
wrote that the Due Process Clause would be violated only if “a rational and fair man 
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles 
as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”
4 In the same 
vein, Justice Felix Frankfurter explicitly urged that in assessing due process questions, 
courts should ask whether proceedings “offend those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.”
5 In important cases, 
the Court has sought to cabin the reach of “substantive due process” by asking whether 
the relevant rights are based on longstanding cultural commitments, or instead on novel 
ones, or on the commitments of particular litigants and particular judges.
6  
  Importantly, those who embrace due process traditionalism do not claim that 
judicial practices, as they develop over time, deserve support; they offer no plea for 
common law constitutionalism
7 or for a strong rule of stare decisis.
8 On the contrary, 
their focus is on the claims of the longstanding practices of “our people,”
9 not of our 
judges. It should come as no surprise to find that some due process traditionalists contend 
that judicial practices, constructing rights in common law fashion, are illegitimate and 
should be overruled.
10  
                                                 
3 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
4.Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
5 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). 
6 See cases cited supra note. 
7 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
8 As suggested in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
9 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).  The 
full quotation – that a state regulation violates the Due Process Clause only when it “offends some principle 
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” – comes 
from Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
10 See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US at 592-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course it is true that due process 
traditionalists must come to terms with the Equal Protection Clause, which operates as a constraint on 
longstanding practices, such as discrimination on the basis of race. Due process traditionalists might well 
acknowledge the tradition-rejecting nature of the equal protection guarantee while also insisting that 
longstanding practices are the best guide to understanding the scope of substantive due process. 3 
Although due process traditionalism has played a large role in the Court’s 
decisions, it is highly controversial. Indeed, the major fault line within the Court itself has 
long been between those who seek to limit the reach of the due process clause to rights 
that longstanding traditions recognize as such, and those who believe that “evolving 
traditions” are what matter,
11 or that the Court legitimately brings its own moral 
judgments to bear on substantive due process questions.
12 A decade after the Court’s 
decision, it is clear that Glucksberg failed to entrench due process traditionalism. In 
striking down bans on same-sex relations, Lawrence v. Texas explicitly relies on 
“evolving” judgments, rather than longstanding practices.
13 But the battle between 
traditionalist and more rationalist or critical approaches, allowing courts to scrutinize 
social practices, has yet to be authoritatively resolved. The Court remains sharply divided 
on the proper role of tradition,
14 which continues to play a large role in lower court 
decisions.
15  
Due process traditionalists have yet to explain exactly why traditionalism might 
be an appealing approach to the due process clause. In this Essay, I explore three families 
of explanations. The first, and the most ambitious, points to the fact that traditions have 
been supported by many minds across long periods of time. The second sees 
traditionalism as a second-best substitute for more radical restrictions on substantive uses 
of the due process clause. The third justifies traditionalism on rule-consequentialist 
grounds. 
What I shall call “many minds traditionalism” has intuitive appeal insofar as it 
attempts to anchor constitutional rights in practices that have been wide and deep support. 
Many minds traditionalism has been defended in different ways by Edmund Burke
16 and 
                                                 
11 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
12 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
13 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
14 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 528 US 558 (2003) (rejecting exclusive use of tradition) with id. at 573-75 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that use of substantive due process should be disciplined by reference to 
tradition). 
15 See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3243 (11
th Cir. 2007) (upholding ban on sexual 
devices by reference to tradition); Raich v. Gonzales, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5834 (9
th Cir. 2007) (upholding 
ban on use of marijuana by reference to tradition); Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F Supp 2d 385 (D Mass 2006) 
(upholding “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in U.S. military but reflecting ambivalence about role of tradition 
in due process cases). 
16 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416-451 (Isaac 
Kramnick ed. 1999) 4 
Friedrich Hayek,
17 and under certain conditions, this defense is more than plausible. 
Burke’s own account was largely aggregative, with the suggestion that numerous people 
have signed onto traditions and therefore given them epistemic credentials. Hayek’s 
variety was evolutionary, with the suggestion that traditions have stood the test of time 
and are thus likely to serve valuable social functions. On both the aggregative and 
evolutionary accounts, the persistence of a practice across many minds and many years 
makes it more likely to be correct, wise, or good. The two accounts might even be 
developed into a democratic defense of traditionalism, on the ground that participants in 
traditions are “voters,” to whom judges ought to defer. In the end, however, I shall 
conclude that neither the aggregative nor the evolutionary account adequately justifies 
due process traditionalism. 
If ambitious accounts of this kind fail, it might nonetheless be possible to defend 
due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best solution for those who would like to 
reject substantive due process altogether, but who accept the constraints of stare decisis. 
Suppose that the due process clause is best seen as purely procedural,
18 or that courts 
should approach legislation with a strong presumption of validity.
19 If so, due process 
traditionalism can be understood as a precedent-preserving and indirect way of producing 
the results that would follow from either a procedural approach to the clause or a 
presumption of validity. But there are two problems with this defense of due process 
traditionalism. The first is that it depends on a controversial judgment about what counts 
as a first-best approach. The second problem is that the purportedly second-best might 
turn out to be a wholly inadequate way of accomplishing the first-best goals.  
A third justification for due process traditionalism is rule-consequentialist. The 
simple idea here is that whatever its faults, due process traditionalism produces better 
results than the likely alternatives. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of 
liberty were entirely unreliable, due process traditionalism might look plausible by 
comparison. Perhaps traditions are not especially good, but perhaps they are not so bad, 
and perhaps it is better to tether judges to traditions than to ask them to think about the 
                                                 
17 See Friedrich Hayek, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science, in The Essence of 
Hayek 318 (Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt Leube eds. 1984); see also Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in 
Politics, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (reprint ed. 1998). 
18 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1983). 
19 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 5 
nature of “liberty” on their own. This conclusion depends on normative and empirical 
assumptions that might well be wrong. In the end, however, it points to the most 
promising basis for due process traditionalism. At the very least, it helps to show what 
those who disagree about due process traditionalism are disagreeing about. 
My focus here is on traditionalist approaches to the due process clause, but if the 
analysis is correct, it should have implications for many other constitutional problems. It 
is easy to imagine a traditionalist approach to the separation of powers, with the 
suggestion that longstanding practices deserve respectful attention even if they seem to 
deviate from the original understanding or from an independent analysis of the governing 
constitutional provisions.
20 Traditionalism might also be defended as the proper approach 
to the religion clauses. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s defense of the use of the 
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance was an almost entirely traditionalist 
exercise, stressing practices rather than reasons for practices.
21 Indeed, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s view of the Establishment Clause had a persistent traditionalist feature, at 
least insofar as he would permit public recognition of God by reference not to theories or 
principle, but by reference to history alone.
22  
In numerous domains, traditionalism might be defended on the ground that 
longstanding practices reflect the judgments of many minds, or serve as a second-best 
substitute for an account forbidden by stare decisis, or on rule-consequentialist grounds. 
Whether such a defense could be made convincing cannot be resolved without an 
exploration of the particular domains. But the discussion of these justifications for due 
process traditionalism will bear on traditionalist approaches in numerous other areas.  
The remainder of this Essay comes in three parts. Part II explores many minds 
traditionalism. It begins with the test of numbers, captured in the view that traditions are 
likely to be good or right because they have been supported by so many people over long 
periods of time. Part II also investigates the evolutionary account and the test of time; it 
culminates in an exploration of the claims of democratic traditionalism. Part III asks 
whether due process traditionalism might be adopted as a second-best solution by those 
                                                 
20The Steel Seizure Case, 343 US 579, 594-597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
21 See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow,  542 US 1, 26-32 (2004) (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in 
the judgment).  
22 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). 6 
who want to restrict the scope of the due process clause in more radical ways. Part IV 
explores the possibility of a rule-consequentialist defense of due process traditionalism.  
 
II. Many Minds Traditionalism 
 
My goal in this section is to explore the most ambitious arguments on behalf of 
due process traditionalism, involving the aggregation of numerous views and the benefits 
of evolutionary pressures. For those who invoke the test of numbers and the test of time, 
traditions are highly likely to be wise, right, or good. A related argument points to the 
democratic credentials of longstanding practices. Such practices appear to have been 
supported by numerous people who have “voted” on their behalf. Judges might be asked 
to hesitate before disturbing practices that have obtained so many “votes” over long 
periods of time. 
 
A. The Test of Numbers 
 
1. Prejudice as “latent wisdom.” Might traditions deserve respect simply because 
they have been accepted by numerous people? Edmund Burke offered the canonical 
argument on behalf of this view.
23 Above all, Burke was skeptical of efforts to deploy 
reason in the service of “exploding general prejudices.”
24 On the contrary, he believed 
that it is best to try “to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in” those very 
prejudices. Burke argued that the “science of government . . requires experience, and 
even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and 
observing he may be.”
 25 In his view, sensible people “are afraid to put men to live and 
trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each 
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general 
bank and capital of nations, and of ages.”
26  
                                                 
23 I explore a Burkean approach in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 
353 (2006). My goal there was to reconstruct, as sympathetically as possible, the nature and foundations of 
Burkean approaches to the Constitution; here I ask more critically whether that approach is proper for the 
due process clause. 
24 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416 (Isaac 
Kramnick ed. 1999) 
25 Id. at 428. 
26 Id. 7 
Burke’s central argument against the “private stock of reason,” and on behalf of 
society’s “general bank and capital,” points to the large number of people who are 
responsible for creating traditions. The “latent wisdom” of traditions lies in the fact that 
so many people have subscribed to them. 
  Suppose in this light that there is a longstanding tradition of allowing married 
people to decide how many children to have, and that there is no tradition of allowing 
people to commit suicide. If so, it seems clear that numerous people have believed that 
married people should be permitted to decide how many children to have, and that 
numerous people have also concluded should not be permitted to kill themselves. And if 
many people have reached these conclusions, perhaps the Court should pay careful 
attention to their judgments. It would be foolish for the Court to use an abstract account, 
invoked by lawyers and theorists, as the basis for challenging practices long accepted by 
many. The aggregative view certainly so suggests.  
  That view has become newly salient, for a great deal of recent attention has been 
given to the “wisdom of crowds.”
27 Those who emphasize crowd wisdom notice that on 
many questions, the average or majority answer of a large group of people is often better 
than the answer of an actual or appointed expert.
28 Much of the wisdom of crowds is best 
understood in light of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.29 To understand the operation of the 
Jury Theorem, assume that a group consists of a number of people, all of whom has a 
greater than 50 percent chance of being right on some question of fact. The Jury Theorem 
says that the likelihood that the group’s majority will be right approaches 100 percent as 
the size of the group expands. The Jury Theorem provides an apparent basis for 
answering hard questions by asking about the views of large groups of people. Perhaps 
such groups are highly likely to be right. 
We can readily see how the Jury Theorem might support a great deal of faith in 
traditions. If the public has long rejected one alleged right, and long supported another, 
there is reason to believe that many people have made relevant judgments, in a way that 
gives a longstanding practice a kind of epistemic credential. Even if evolutionary 
                                                 
27 See James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (2004). 
28 See id.; Scott Page, The Difference (2006). 
29For a clear outline, see William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group 
Judgment:  Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. Risk & Uncertainty 147, 
152–54 (2002). 8 
pressures are put to one side, the support of large numbers of people suggests that 
traditions are likely to have solid foundations. On this view, the Court should be reluctant 
to reject rights that are deeply rooted in actual practice, or to create rights that are not so 
rooted, precisely because the Court’s judges are few and the supporters of traditions are 
many. If the Constitution is unclear, the Court might do best to investigate longstanding 
social practices, instead of imposing a view of its own. 
2.  Three problems. In many domains, the aggregative view has considerable 
force.
30 But as a defense of due process traditionalism, the aggregative view run into 
three serious problems. Taken as a whole, these problems raise real doubts about the view 
that such traditionalism can be supported by reference to the judgments of many minds. 
a. What proposition? The Jury Theorem is concerned with the truth of certain 
propositions. If a majority of people believe that X is true, X is highly likely to be true 
(under the stated conditions). But what proposition does a tradition support? By 
participating in the creation of a tradition, have people thereby “voted” in favor of some 
proposition, and if so, which one? 
It would be easiest to answer this question if the tradition reflects a judgment in 
favor of a proposition of fact. But is there a question of fact to which a tradition offers an 
implicit answer? Suppose that a society has long imposed capital punishment. It might be 
tempting to say that the tradition reflects a judgment that capital punishment has a 
deterrent effect. But such a tradition might persist not on deterrence grounds, but because 
most people believe that capital punishment is justified for reasons of retribution—in 
which case it would be hard to discern a factual proposition implicit in the tradition. Or 
suppose that a society has long permitted married couples to have as many children as 
they want, or that it has long forbidden people from committing suicide, smoking 
marijuana, or engaging in same-sex relations. It would be difficult to say that the 
longstanding practice suggests support for some identifiable proposition of fact.  
Much more plausibly, a longstanding tradition is best taken to suggest the truth of 
some normative proposition that the tradition endorses by definition, such as, “married 
couples should be allowed to have as many children as they like,” or “people should be 
                                                 
30 See Page, supra note, and Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (2006), for 
elaboration. 9 
prevented from committing suicide.” If many people have independently accepted or 
rejected such a proposition, their judgment might be entitled to weight. At first glance, 
the Jury Theorem so suggests.  
But there are two possible objections to this view. The first is that the Jury 
Theorem is best taken only to concern matters of fact, on which it is easy to speak of 
truth or falsity. It might well seem jarring to suggest that a judgment in favor of some 
tradition is “true.” Is it sensible to say that if many people believe that married people 
should be allowed to choose the number of children that they will have, they are likely to 
be right? The answer is that it is indeed sensible to speak in these terms if we are not 
relativists or skeptics about normative questions, and if we believe that such questions 
have correct answers. Those entrusted with the job of interpretation the Due Process 
Clause had better avoid relativism or skepticism, because it is difficult to construe the 
clause without thinking that it is possible to think well or badly about normative 
questions.
31 And on reflection, the grounds for moral or political relativism and 
skepticism are exceedingly weak.
32 It follows that the Jury Theorem is indeed applicable 
to normative statements as well as to statements of fact. 
The second objection is much more powerful. We might be able to agree that for a 
long time, many people have accepted the proposition that married couples should be 
allowed to have as many children as they like. But suppose that in 2050, the nation 
imposes a ceiling—say, of four—on the number of children that people may have. Does 
the tradition set itself in opposition to that ceiling? The answer may not be so clear. If the 
nation, or even a state, imposes such a ceiling, circumstances are likely to be very 
different from what they were when the tradition was in force. And if this is so, the 
proposition supported by the tradition is properly described in the following way: “Under 
the circumstances prevailing between (say) 1800 and 2049, married couples should be 
permitted to have as many children as they wanted.” And if it is so described, it does not, 
in fact, bear on the problem at hand. 
                                                 
31 An ambitious version of this view can be found in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006). Contested 
moral or political arguments might be avoided if we could agree that the text of the clause forbids 
substantive due process, and if we believed that the word “liberty” should be given content by reference to 
the original understanding. But a controversial argument is needed on behalf of the view that the text 
should be controlling in light of many decades of decisions employing substantive due process, and also in 
defense of originalism. 
32 See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Morality (1972). 10 
Perhaps circumstances have changed because of a significant problem of 
overpopulation; perhaps a new disease has prompted the new policy. Whatever the reason 
for that policy, the proposition definitionally supported by the tradition may not 
definitionally decide the question that arises if and when the government imposes the 
ceiling.
33 Hence we may not be able to agree that many minds have, in fact, committed 
themselves to the relevant proposition, which is whether a ceiling on the number of 
children is acceptable in 2050. And if the nation does impose that ceiling at that time, 
many minds are likely to have supported it under the current conditions.
34 Is it so clear 
that they do not deserve priority over the many minds who came before
35? By hypothesis, 
the current minds are speaking to the circumstances of the present, which no one has 
done in the past. 
The problem, in short, is that traditions apply only to the circumstances in which 
they governed, and when circumstances have changed, it is not clear that many minds 
have decided in favor of the particular tradition that is being invoked. This claim has 
general implications. Suppose that there is a tradition against physician-assisted suicide, 
extending from the founding until the day before yesterday. It remains possible that 
physician-assisted suicide under contemporary conditions is meaningfully different from 
physician-assisted suicide under previous conditions. Perhaps physician-assisted suicide 
is more appealing because of technological changes that have made it possible for 
physicians to honor people’s requests for death in a humane way. In that event, the 
proposition supported by the tradition does not speak to the current problem. Whenever a 
longstanding tradition is being violated, there is a good chance that the existing situation 
is indeed relevantly different. 
It is true that due process traditionalists need not be entirely discomfited by the 
latter conclusion. Perhaps they would readily agree that traditions often will not speak, 
with any kind of clarity, to the current question, but perhaps that is no problem for them. 
They believe that a clear tradition is a necessary condition for a convincing substantive 
due process claim, and if no such tradition can be identified, the plaintiff loses. The real 
                                                 
33 I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for pressing this point. 
34 See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason (unpublished 
manuscript 2007). 
35 See id. 11 
problem for due process traditionalism is the claim that a longstanding tradition is a 
sufficient condition for invalidation. If circumstances have changed, then the proposition 
for which the tradition speaks may not bear on the question at hand. To the extent that 
this is so, due process traditionalists will have to concede that even when a practice has 
endured for a long time, it may not justify invalidation of apparently tradition-rejecting 
enactments, because those enactments may not, on reflection, reject the proposition that 
the tradition actually supports. 
b. Systematic bias or “prejudice.” The Jury Theorem says that if the group is 
larger enough, the majority view is likely to be correct if all or most members are more 
than 50 percent likely to be right. But suppose that all or most members are less than 50 
percent likely to be right. If so, the likelihood that the majority will be wrong approaches 
100 percent as the size of the group expands.
36 It follows that even if some proposition 
has passed the test of numbers, it will be incorrect if most people are more likely to be 
wrong than right. This point raises serious problems for many minds traditionalism. 
Condorcet himself emphasized that “prejudice” can introduce a distortion that 
makes aggregated judgments unlikely to produce good results: “In effect, when the 
probability of the truth of a voter’s opinion falls below 1/2, there must be a reason why he 
decides less well than one would at random. The reason can only be found in the 
prejudices to which this voter is subject.”
37 For due process traditionalists, the irony is 
that Burke himself wrote as if “prejudices” are reliable, contending that a “prejudice” is 
“wisdom without reflection, and above it.”
38 But if prejudices are systematic biases, then 
they are wisdom without reflection, and below it; and endorsement of a proposition by 
many minds is no protection against error.  
Suppose that traditions reject a certain right—say, the right to racial 
intermarriage, to same-sex relations, or to same-sex marriage. If those who create the 
tradition are systematically biased, the tradition lacks epistemic credentials. For purposes 
of constitutional law, Condorcet’s reference to “prejudice” suggests the possibility that 
the Equal Protection Clause might be used to test the question whether the tradition 
                                                 
36 See also Page, supra note, at 205-14 (showing that if individuals are especially inaccurate, group average 
will be inaccurate too, though number of group errors will be lower than individual errors if group is 
diverse). 
37 CONDORCET, SELECTED WRITINGS 62 (Keith Michael Baker, ed., 1976).  
38 See Burke, supra note. 12 
embeds discrimination. Alternatively, judges who engage in substantive due process 
might want not to entrench traditions but to ask whether there is, in principle, any 
distinction between a challenged practice and the practices that the tradition 
unambiguously supports. If no such distinction can be identified, a systematic bias might 
well be at work. The general point is that such a bias might mean that the proposition on 
which the tradition has converged is false. To the extent that this is so, the aggregative 
defense of many minds traditionalism, rooted in Burke, seems to be in tatters. 
c. Independent judgments. For the aggregative view to work, those who contribute 
to a tradition must be making independent judgments. This point raises distinctive 
difficulties.  
(i)  Authoritarianism and its analogues. It should be obvious that on the 
aggregative view, longstanding practices would have no epistemic force in an 
authoritarian society. In such a society, many traditions are an imposition; they are 
enforced by an oppressive government. If so, there is no reason to think that they reflect 
the judgments of large numbers of people. It follows that many minds arguments on 
behalf of longstanding practices are implausible in regimes that lack a high degree of 
freedom, at least if those practices are themselves an imposition by the few on the many. 
Burke’s own claims have greatest weight in democratic societies whose citizens are able 
to assess and to refashion traditions; their force is greatly diminished in societies that 
have long lived under autocratic rule. We might therefore understand the conclusion that 
while many minds traditionalism makes sense for England and America, it is ill-suited to 
such nations as China, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
39 
For purposes of substantive due process in the United States, the point about 
authoritarian societies might seem uninteresting. No one contends that judges in new 
democracies should decide on the content of rights by asking about the judgments of their 
authoritarian precursors.
40 But even in free societies, there may be analogous problems 
Perhaps a relevant tradition has been imposed by some on others through the force of 
                                                 
39 It remains possible that tradition-rejecting initiatives will cause serious problems in authoritarian 
societies, simply because citizens will refuse to accept those initiatives. See James Scott, Seeing Like A 
State (1999). But this pragmatic argument is not a point in favor of many minds traditionalism. 
40 Of course there are complex questions here about the relationship between culture and law. Perhaps legal 
initiatives cannot succeed if they fit poorly with culture, at least if they cannot change culture. For 
illuminating discussion, see Scott, supra note. 13 
law. The most obvious example is slavery. It is implausible to think that slavery can be 
defended by reference to the fact that many people lived in accordance with it. Or 
consider practices of discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. To the extent that 
these forms of discrimination have been imposed or encouraged by law, it is odd to say 
that they should be perpetuated on the ground that many people have accepted them. The 
Jury Theorem is not easily invoked to suggest that the best way to evaluate social 
practices involving the treatment of those with mental illness, or the relationship between 
men and women, is to ask a large number of people and to accept the majority’s answer.  
As I have suggested, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural source of judicial 
skepticism about longstanding practices. By requiring unequal treatment to be justified in 
principle, the equal protection guarantee explicitly rejects many minds traditionalism.
41 
But suppose that no serious equal protection issue is present, and that a tradition is 
challenged by those who contend that it has long been imposed rather than freely 
accepted. If the contention is correct, the force of the aggregative view is sharply 
diminished. 
(ii) The Burkean paradox. Adrian Vermeule has drawn attention to the Burkean 
paradox
42—the possibility that many minds traditionalism will turn out to be self-
defeating. Suppose that people generally follow traditions, not because they believe that 
the traditions are good, but because they believe that traditions are likely to embody 
collective wisdom. To the extent that people have long behaved in this way, traditions 
lose their epistemic credentials, simply because they have been followed by people who 
have not made any judgment on their behalf. The Jury Theorem argument works well 
only if the practices of those who accept the argument are not taken into account by those 
who are deciding whether to accept the argument!  
For the aggregative view to work, it must be the case that many of those who have 
contributed to the tradition have made an independent judgment on its behalf. In 
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Vemeule’s account, this is the Burkean paradox.
43 Those who follow traditions, on 
Burkean grounds, end up undermining the Burkean defense of traditionalism. 
This argument is devastating to due process traditionalism insofar as (a) 
established practices are being taken as a sufficient condition for judicial invalidation and 
(b) those practices are not a product of the independent judgments of many minds. But 
perhaps many minds traditionalism can be justified in terms that deny (b). Let us suppose 
that most of those who follow a tradition are usually not doing so mechanically; if the 
tradition is evidently silly or harmful, they will reject it. Even the most committed 
traditionalists should be willing to rethink their practices if they are evidently destructive 
or pointless. But for the aggregative argument, a real problem remains: Many minds 
traditionalism has to be discounted to the extent that the relevant traditions have been 
followed by those who have not made their own judgments.  
(iii) Traditions as cascades. A related problem for the aggregative argument will 
arise if people’s judgments are a product of a cascade.
44 In an informational cascade, 
most people form their judgments on the basis of the actual or apparent judgments of 
others.
45 Consider a stylized example. Adams says that in her view, the death penalty 
deters crime. Barnes does not have a great deal of private information, but having heard 
Adams’ belief, she agrees that the death penalty deters crime. Carlton might well believe 
that he must have to reliable independent information in order to reject the shared views 
of Adams and Barnes—and he lacks that information. If he follows Adams and Barnes on 
the ground that their belief is likely to be right, Carlton is in a cascade.  
This cascade involves a question of fact: whether the death penalty deters crime. 
But it is easy to imagine normative analogues,
46 in which Carlton follows Adams and 
Barnes, not because not because he independently agrees with them, but because he, like 
Barnes, does not have enough confidence in his antecedent normative views to reject the 
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judgments of others who came before. The general objection is that many traditions may 
persist only because of a cascade effect, depriving them of the epistemic credentials 
urged by the aggregative view. “Moral panics”
47 often reflect cascade effects. Perhaps 
some traditions are, to a greater or lesser extent, a product of moral panics. And whether 
or not they are, it is easy to imagine traditions that continue through imitative behavior, 
ensuring the perpetuation of cascades, rather than independent support from many 
minds.
48 
The best response is that an informational cascade is most unlikely to account for 
a tradition, simply because such cascades are quite fragile.
49 Suppose that people engage 
in certain behavior or accept certain beliefs solely on the ground that other people have 
engaged in that behavior or accepted those beliefs. Once private information begins to 
emerge, it should defeat the cascade. If people learn that a supposed cure for the common 
cold does not work, they will cease purchasing the relevant product. Informational 
cascades stop once people have sufficient information to outweigh the signals given by 
the acts and statements of their predecessors.  
Cascade effects can account for fads and fashions, but they should not be able to 
explain longstanding practices, simply because those practices should be exposed if they 
are based on falsehoods or do not properly serve the people who participate in them. But 
for purposes of due process traditionalism, the problem of cascade effects cannot be 
dismissed so easily. Reputational pressures might ensure that people do not break the 
cascade, even if their private information suggests that they ought to do so; as a result, 
unpopular practices can persist for long periods.
50 An additional question is whether in 
the relevant domains, people receive a clear signal that the general practice is a bad one.
51 
An answer to this question requires a shift from the aggregative view to the evolutionary 
alternative; I will turn to that alternative momentarily.  
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For the moment, it should be clear that on purely aggregative grounds, it is very 
hard to defend due process traditionalism. Even if a tradition has been accepted by many 
minds, it may not reflect approval of any relevant proposition. Even if it does, those who 
created and perpetuated the tradition may suffer from a systematic bias. Even if they do 
not, many of them may have simply followed the tradition, rather than independently 
agreeing to it. It follows that a longstanding practice provides a fragile basis for judicial 
invalidation of democratic outcomes.
52 It also follows that even if a practice has been 
longstanding, it may lack the credentials that give many minds traditionalism its appeal. 
 
B. The Test of Time 
 
  Perhaps due process traditionalists should emphasize the test of time. On one 
view, practices are likely to endure if and only if they are good. The central point is that 
an enduring tradition must be serving some valuable function; if it were not doing so, it 
would not be enduring. As we shall see, this point might ultimately form the foundation 
for a democratic conception of traditionalism, one that sees longstanding practices as a 
product of numerous “voters” extending over time. 
 1.  “The grown morals of tradition.” The most elaborate version of this view 
comes from Hayek.
53 Like Burke, Hayek urges that existing moral commitments are not 
the product of any single mind; what Hayek adds is that our “undesigned moral 
tradition”
54 is a product of evolutionary pressures. That moral tradition covers the family 
and the rules of property, including “the rules of the stability of possessions, its 
transference by consent, and the keeping of promises.”
55 Human beings were not clever 
enough to design the order “from which billions . . . now draw their sustenance.” On the 
contrary, that sustenance comes from our “obedience to traditional customs which were 
selected by group evolution without [our] understanding them.” The system of property 
rights developed “not because some liked or understood its effects, but because it made 
possible the growth of the groups practicing it to grow faster than others.”
56 
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  Hayek explicitly calls attention to evolution in this regard.
57 What is crucial is the 
process of group selection, which “will select customs whose beneficial assistance to the 
survival of men are not perceived by the individuals.” Human beings are dependent for 
their survival on the observance of “practices which they cannot rationally justify, and 
which may conflict with both their innate instincts on the one hand, and their intellectual 
insight on the other.” At least this is so for “the grown morals of tradition.”
58 In Hayek’s 
hands, the villain of the piece is rationalism, which attempts to deduce moral principles 
from reason.
59 (The connection with constitutional debates should be plain.) In the end 
the “moral tradition remains a treasure which reason cannot replace, but can only 
endeavor to improve by immanant criticism, that is, by endeavoring to make a system 
which we cannot create as a whole, serve more consistently the same set of interests.”
60 
What rationalists ridicule as “’the dead hand of tradition’ may contain conditions for the 
existence of modern mankind.”
61 
2. Mechanisms and criteria. Hayek’s arguments, growing out of his work on the 
price system,
62 have considerable intuitive appeal, but they face a central problem.
63 
Those who defend traditions by reference to evolutionary accounts must undertake two 
independent tasks. First, they must specify the mechanisms by which evolutionary 
pressures produce good outcomes. Second, they must offer some kind of account by 
which we can judge outcomes to be good. In biology, both the specification and the 
account are easy to produce. Natural selection ensures the survival of those who are most 
likely to be able to reproduce, and those who have survived are good by reference to the 
criterion of reproductive fitness. In the domain of social practices, what is the analogue?  
Hayek himself drew directly on natural selection, and if we are speaking literally 
of survival, his argument may be on firm ground. Perhaps some moral principles, or 
commitments, are necessary or at least extremely helpful for survival of the species. In 
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fact it is plausible to say that some such principles are hard-wired and have been 
specifically selected by their contribution to human survival.
64 Perhaps certain moral 
attitudes toward young children, and even respect for property rights, can be understood 
in these terms. Indeed, Hayek’s arguments might point to a defense of those forms of 
substantive due process that attempt to entrench the evolved moral order.
65 But principles 
of this kind are most unlikely to be tested in modern substantive due process cases. If 
people are given a right to use contraceptives, to use marijuana or sexual devices, to seek 
physician-assisted suicide, to wear motorcycles without helmets, or to engage in same-
sex relations, the species will not be endangered. Human survival may well depend on 
some kind of system of property rights, but does it really depend on those aspects of 
traditional morality that are challenged in courts via a more critical or rationalist 
approach to the due process clause? Even if it did, many due process claims do not reject 
traditions; they simply cannot claim strong roots in traditions.  
  Perhaps survival is beside the point. Perhaps we should say that an enduring 
practice is likely, by definition, to promote economic efficiency (or some other 
conception of human welfare). If evolution is not at work, perhaps the mechanism is a 
form of market competition. The notion of customary law, emphasized by Hayek himself, 
is helpful here.
66 To the extent that commercial practices are a product of a spontaneous 
order, those practices might operate to promote efficiency. If efficiency is desirable in the 
commercial domain, judges and legislatures might build on those practices, rather than 
displacing them by reference to theories of their own.
67 But what, exactly, is the market 
that produces traditional morality, and why is it so clear that this particular market 
functions well? Why should invisible hand mechanisms, or spontaneous orders, be 
celebrated in the moral domain
68? Consider the set of practices that have been or might 
be challenged in due process cases: bans on the use of contraceptives, on abortion, on 
same-sex relations, on certain living arrangements, on same-sex marriage, on physician-
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assisted suicide, on the use of sexual aids or certain drugs. To the extent that such bans 
are time-honored, it is clear that the political market has long favored them. But in a 
democracy, the political market hardly guarantees efficiency, and it need not promote 
welfare
69; the role of collective action problems, incomplete information, and interest-
group pressures need not be belabored here.
70  
Even if the relevant “market” did promote efficiency, it remains necessary to 
defend the proposition that efficient traditions should be upheld because they are 
efficient.
71 In the commercial realm, it is plausible to say that courts should generally 
respect practices that have evolved in a way that ensures efficiency. But why should the 
due process clause should be read to promote economic efficiency?  
  The evolutionary defense of many minds traditionalism turns out to be extremely 
fragile, at least in due process cases. To accept that defense, we would need to identify 
mechanisms that ensure that longstanding practices are good by reference to some 
constitutionally relevant criterion. In the absence of such mechanisms, the most that 
might be said is that even if evolutionary practices offer no guarantees, the likelihood of 
judicial error is so high that judges do best if they attend to traditions. I will explore this 
claim below. But unless judges are wholly at sea, it might be best to explore whether the 
practice in question is, in fact, good, or good enough, by reference to a constitutionally 
relevant criterion.
72 Evolutionary pressures are beside the point. 
 
C. Democratic Traditionalism 
 
Perhaps it would be possible to understand many minds traditionalism in general, 
and the tests of numbers and time in particular, in a different way. On one view, the 
judgments of many people, extending over long periods, deserve respect on essentially 
democratic grounds. The claim is not that those judgments are necessarily right or true. It 
is instead that they are, in a sense, votes; and if the same votes have been made by 
multiple generations, then they deserve respect. We might descrive this approach as a 
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kind of democratic traditionalism. It supports traditionalist approaches to the due process 
clause not on the epistemic grounds suggested by the aggregative and evolutionary 
accounts, but on the theory that if so many citizens have committed themselves to a 
practice, their judgments deserve judicial deference for that very reason. Justice Scalia, 
speaking for a plurality of the Court, has spoken in just these terms, suggesting that 
consultation of specific traditions ensures that judges will remain faithful to “the society’s 
views.”
73  
To be sure, it is difficult to see either Burke or Hayek themselves as democrats; 
both of them had serious reservations about self-government as an organizing ideal.
74 But 
if traditions have been created and repeatedly affirmed by free citizens, they might well 
be defended on democratic grounds. Courts might be asked to consult those traditions, 
and to uphold them, on the ground that the judges’ “private stock of wisdom” has far less 
legitimacy than do practices that so many people have voluntarily accepted. 
  The initial problem for this defense of due process traditionalism is that 
democratic processes might and often do reject longstanding practices. Suppose, for 
example, that a democratic public challenges practices of discrimination on the basis of 
sex or sexual orientation, or that a democratic public concludes that the occupancy of 
buildings should be narrowly limited to “a few categories of related individuals.”
75 On 
democratic grounds, why should the old tradition prevail over the current judgment? 
Democratic traditionalists will want to reply that longstanding practices have survived the 
test of time, but we have seen many problems with that particular test. For this reason, 
democratic traditionalists might have to agree that longstanding practices must yield 
before an explicit democratic repudiation. Perhaps they will ask for a clear democratic 
judgment in opposition to the tradition; but if such a judgment has been made, traditions 
will have to bow before democracy.
76 
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What remains, for such traditionalists, is the narrower but nonetheless important 
claim that courts should not lightly reject longstanding practices on their own; if a 
plaintiff’s claim cannot find support in such practices, judges should reject it. This 
approach is undoubtedly attractive, for it might be seen as doubly democratic. First, it 
refuses to permit plaintiffs to attack longstanding practices; second, the refusal operates 
to support existing legislation against judicial attack. The problem with this position is 
that for reasons explored above, traditions may lack anything like a good democratic 
pedigree. They might be an imposition. They might reflect a systematic bias. People 
might have supported traditions not because they are good, but because they are 
following their predecessors. The problems with the aggregative and evolutionary 
accounts turn out to beset democratic traditionalism as well.  
To be sure, those problems are not entirely devastating. We could imagine 
domains in which practices are not an imposition, are unlikely to reflect a bias, and have 
been perpetuated by a large number of independent judgments. But in many cases in 
which longstanding practices are challenged, democratic traditionalism will not have 
much force. 
 
III. Traditionalism as a Second-Best Solution 
 
  Even if the aggregative and evolutionary accounts turn out to be unconvincing, 
and even if democratic traditionalism is rejected, we can imagine other grounds for due 
process traditionalism. Most obviously, the effort to root substantive due process in 
longstanding practices might operate as a second-best substitute for another, preferable 
approach. 
 
A. First-Best, Second-Best 
 
  Many people believe that the due process clause is purely procedural and that the 
whole idea of substantive due process is textually unrooted.
77 On this view, the best 
approach would be to abandon substantive due process altogether. But even if this is so, it 
would seem too late in the day to take that approach, which would challenge not merely 
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the most controversial exercises in substantive due process,
78 but also a range of 
decisions that are firmly entrenched in constitutional law.
79 If those decisions are taken as 
given, due process traditionalism might be seen to be a second-best substitute for the 
complete abandonment of substantive due process. With due process traditionalism, it 
should be possible to prevent other ventures in substantive due process while also 
preserving a great deal of the doctrinal status quo. 
There is a second view for which due process traditionalism might be a second-
best substitute. Suppose that we embrace the position associated with James Bradley 
Thayer, which asks judges to defer to any plausible understanding of the Constitution.
80 
Thayer insisted that because the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who 
decide on its meaning must inevitably exercise discretion.
81 Thayer thought that courts 
should strike down laws only “when those who have the right to make laws have not 
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to 
rational question.”
82 The question for courts “is not one of the mere and simple 
preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt . . . .”
83 For committed Thayerians, aggressive decisions under the due 
process clause are objectionable not because substantive due process does not exist, but 
solely because of their aggressiveness; courts should give democratic processes the 
benefit of every doubt.  
It should be easy to see how due process traditionalism might be a second-best 
substitute for a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. Suppose it is believed that very 
few legislative decisions will actually violate longstanding understandings of rights, and 
that most plaintiffs, invoking the due process clause, will be attempting not to vindicate 
traditions but to create new rights grounded in some theory of what people should be able 
to do—as, for example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,
84 Roe v. Wade,
85 and Lawrence v. 
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Texas.
86 If this is so, then due process traditionalism is likely to operate as a kind of 
shield for government, one that produces results identical to those that would be achieved 
by a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. It is for this reason that committed 
Thayerians, aware that their general approach is both inconsistent with current law and 
unlikely to receive widespread assent, might be drawn to due process traditionalism. In 
fact it is easy to imagine an incompletely theorized agreement between proceduralists and 
Thayerians, both taking traditionalism as an acceptable second-best. 
Here is a different way to understand the basic point. To decide difficult cases, 
judges must identify their preferred approach to constitutional provisions; they must also 
ask how that approach can be squared with existing law. If judges are committed to stare 
decisis, they might have to depart from the reasoning and the results suggested by their 
preferred approach. From one perspective, the departure is actually the first-best, because 
it incorporates the (principled) commitment to respecting past rulings. When I describe 
traditionalism as a second-best, it is with the understanding that if the slate were clean, a 
procedural approach, or a Thayerian one, would be preferable.  
 
B. Three Problems 
 
For both camps, however, there are serious problems.  
1.  Traditions can be swords. Traditionalism can operate as a sword against 
government, not merely a shield in government’s favor. To that extent, it disserves the 
goals of those who seek to cabin the role of substantive due process. In striking down 
President Bush’s effort to use military commissions to try suspected terrorists, the Court 
relied heavily on its judgment that conspiracy counts had not, by tradition, been subject to 
trial in military courts.
87 The Court’s decision was not based on the due process clause, of 
course, but it would not exactly be stunning to find that traditionalism could lead to 
invalidations no less than validations. Indeed, two of the most prominent due process 
cases do exactly that. Justice Harlan defended the outcome in Griswold by reference to 
what he describes as the longstanding tradition of respect for sexual privacy within 
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marriage,
88 and Justice Harlan’s view is now largely taken to provide the most plausible 
understanding of Griswold.
89 In any event, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. 
City of Cleveland
90 struck down a ban on family living arrangements on the ground that 
the ban was inconsistent with longstanding traditions.
91  
Perhaps second-best defenses of due process traditionalism might recognize that 
on some occasions, the approach will require invalidation. But perhaps the fear of 
invalidation should not be taken as devastating to the second-best project, because new 
practices will frequently be distinguishable from those that came before, and hence will 
rarely be struck down under a traditionalist approach. On this view, Griswold and Moore 
are outliers, and unlikely to have many successors. It is true that traditions may turn out 
to be swords, but traditionalists will insist that their approach will rarely require 
invalidation of democratically approved legislation. 
2.  Traditions unleashed. Even if this is so, there is an additional problem. 
Traditions can be read at many different levels of generality, ranging from the highly 
particularistic to the very abstract.
92 Because traditions can be read abstractly, due 
process traditionalism might not constrain discretion at all. On the contrary, it might turn 
out to be an invitation for judges to invalidate practices however they see fit. If judges 
read American traditions to create a right to sexual autonomy, bans on prostitution and 
incest would face serious constitutional doubts. If judges read American traditions to 
suggest a right of free choice in the domain of marriage, bans on same-sex marriage 
would seem to be in constitutional jeopardy. Perhaps any characterization of a tradition 
will be interpretive in the sense that it is inevitably an effort not simply to describe 
something, but to cast past practices in the best constructive light.
93 If this is so, judges 
will disagree about the appropriate characterization, because they will disagree about 
what counts as the best constructive light; and their disagreements will defeat the goals of 
those who favor proceduralism or Thayerism.  
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To avoid these problems, and to ensure that due process traditionalism will 
actually operate as a second-best, proceduralists and Thayerians have to urge that 
traditions, to count as such, must be read at a low level of specificity.
94 Specific readings 
are necessary both to cabin judicial discretion and to ensure that judges behave (roughly) 
in a way that proceduralists and Thayerians approve.
95 Thus Justice Scalia has urged that 
the problem with general readings is that they provide “such imprecise guidance” and 
“permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views”; and if judges are not 
bound “by any particular, identifiable tradition,” they are not bound by the “rule of law at 
all.”
96 Perhaps due process traditionalism can operate as a second-best, and in any case 
succeed in disciplining judicial discretion, if past practices are read at a level of great 
specificity. 
A skeptic might respond that if past practices are so read, they will not offer 
guidance at all. Read specifically, traditions govern only the periods and persons to 
whom they actually applied. There does appear to be a tradition in favor of allowing 
parents to have as many children as they like. But as we have seen, that tradition, read at 
a level of great specificity, may not “apply” in any context in which democratic processes 
have repudiated them. A traditionalist must acknowledge that specific readings of past 
practices will have an irreducible interpretive dimension—enabling the judge to explain 
whether current circumstances are relevantly different, so as to render the tradition 
inapplicable. If a due process traditionalist will not allow states to restrict couples to two 
children, or to ban married people from using contraceptives, it must be because any 
difference between the past and the present is deemed irrelevant.  
But perhaps Justice Scalia, and other traditionalists, need not be disturbed by this 
concession. In insisting that traditions must be read at a high level of specificity, they are 
saying only that judges must avoid general characterizations that turn traditionalism into 
a license for highly discretionary judgments about the substantive content of liberty.  If 
this is their claim, their real problem is empirical, not conceptual: If specific readings are 
unlikely, then due process traditionalism will fail to serve as a second-best. Optimistic 
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proceduralists and Thayerians will think that failure is avoidable, and they will work hard 
to vindicate their optimism. They will devote every effort to reading traditions in such a 
way as to reduce the risks of open-ended judicial judgments. But as a matter of actual 
practice, their efforts might fail. Traditionalist approaches to individual rights might well 
turn out to be unstable. 
3.  First-best? The second-best defense of due process traditionalism will lack 
much appeal for those who count neither proceduralism nor Thayerism as a first-best. It 
is true that the text of the due process clause is naturally read to be purely procedural, but 
there are countervailing indications in the history of the fourteenth amendment,
97 and in 
any event the existence of a substantive component is well-settled.
98 Within the legal 
culture, there seems to be broad and deep convergence on some form of substantive due 
process, captured in the view that certain intimate choices deserve protection against 
democratic intrusions, at least if those intrusions cannot be convincingly justified. To the 
extent that a purely procedural reading of the due process clause is unappealing, second-
best justifications of due process traditionalism will seem weak. 
Thayerism has been defended quite powerfully,
99 but it has no supporters on the 
Supreme Court, and it will hardly seem a first-best to those who believe that in some 
domains, relatively aggressive forms of substantive due process are both legitimate and 
desirable. To defend due process traditionalism as a second-best for Thayerism, it is 
necessary to convince skeptics both that they should prefer a Thayerian approach to the 
due process clause and that traditionalism is a reasonable way of adopting the basic goals 
of that approach. Skeptics will not be easily persuaded.  
VI. Rule-Consequentialism 
 
There is a final possibility. Perhaps due process traditionalism can be justified on 
rule-consequentialist grounds.
100 The basic idea is that if judges are unleashed from 
traditions, they will produce many bad results, and that if judges are tethered to traditions, 
they will do fairly well—simply because our particular traditions, with respect to 
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substantive rights, outperform any catalogue likely to be produced by judges. At least this 
might be so if we consider the fact that democratic majorities, at the state or federal level, 
can create substantive rights if they choose to do so.  
A basic concern here is that the idea of “liberty,” taken in the abstract, can be read 
in diverse ways, and there is no particular reason to trust judicial readings, even or 
perhaps especially if they are morally infused. It is true that the aggregative and 
evolutionary accounts offer insufficient reason to accept many minds traditionalism in its 
most ambitious forms, but the real question is comparative, and perhaps we can agree that 
at least in the United States, traditional conceptions of individual rights are good place to 
start. When such conceptions prove inadequate, political processes can and often do pick 
up the slack, as for example through statutory protections accorded to privacy rights.
101 
And when traditions are palpably unjust, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural route 
by which they might be challenged. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of 
“liberty” are highly unreliable, due process traditionalism might turn out to be the best 
imaginable approach. 
The underlying questions cannot be answered in the abstract; they call for both 
normative and predictive judgments. Due process traditionalists might reasonably believe 
that judicial judgments will reflect normative commitments that do not deserve special 
respect and that in any case ought not to be imposed on citizens. Lochner v. New York,
102 
prompting Holmes’ traditionalism, is the obvious example for most, whereas Roe v. 
Wade
103 is the salient example for many. Those who reject due process traditionalism 
insist that judicial elaboration of the content of “liberty” is far more likely to produce 
better outcomes than an approach that is tied to longstanding practices. They favor a 
more rationalist or critical approach to the due process clause, in which judges question 
traditions by the light of reason, ensuring that they can survive the appropriate standard 
of review. 
If such an approach is to be defended, it might be on the institutional grounds 
sketched by Alexander Bickel, who insisted that “courts have certain capacities for 
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dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess.”
104 In 
Bickel’s view, “judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation 
follow the ways of the scholar” in thinking about those enduring values.
105 “Their 
insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to men’s better 
natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment’s 
hue and cry.”
106 Thus Bickel concluded that “no other branch of government is nearly so 
well equipped to conduct” a kind of vital natural seminar, through which the most basic 
principles are discovered and announced.
107  
To those who fear the exercise of judicial discretion, it might be responded that 
the appointments process, together with internal restraints on judicial judgments,
108 
creates sufficient protection against the relevant risks. Judges do not create due process 
doctrine out of whole cloth; they rely on their previous decisions, and they rarely depart 
radically from them. If Bickel is right about judicial capacities, and if the external and 
internal constraints on judicial discretion are real, the rule-consequentialist defense of due 
process traditionalism is unlikely to seem unconvincing. We are better off if traditions are 
a place to start but not to end, and if courts occasionally deploy a more critical approach, 
testing whether the tradition is sensible in principle. It is not clear that the underlying 
disagreement can be resolved in the abstract; it depends on both normative judgments and 
predictions about judicial performance. But at least we should now be in a position to 
identify the questions on which reasonable people might disagree. 
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Conclusion 
 
The most ambitious defenses of due process traditionalism, drawing on Burke and 
Hayek, emphasize that many minds are necessary to constitute a tradition, and that many 
minds are far more likely to be right than those who deploy their private stock of reason. 
The aggregative version of this view runs into three problems. First, numerous people 
may not have accepted a proposition that is relevant to the legal issue at hand. Second, 
many minds might suffer from a systematic bias. Third, people may have participated in a 
cascade, depriving the tradition of the degree of support that the aggregative view 
demands. The problem with the evolutionary account is that it is hard to identify a 
mechanism to ensure that traditional practices are good, or even good enough, in any 
relevant sense. Democratic traditionalists insist that longstanding practices are supported 
by numerous “votes.” But at least for the problems typically raised in due process cases, 
the same difficulties that undermine the aggregative and evolutionary accounts beset 
efforts to defend traditions on democratic grounds. 
Alternative defenses see due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best 
substitute for a procedural account of the due process clause or for a form of Thayerism. 
Ideas of this sort undoubtedly help explain the appeal of due process traditionalism 
within the judiciary. If “substantive due process” is constitutionally baseless but firmly 
entrenched, a traditionalist approach might seem the best way out of a bad situation. 
Unfortunately, the substitute is likely to be quite crude, and it is not clear that a 
procedural account or Thayerism can be convincingly described as first-best.  
It is also possible to defend due process traditionalism in rule-consequentialist 
terms. The central idea would be that notwithstanding the failures of the aggregative and 
evolutionary accounts, our own traditions are generally good, and judicial judgments 
about the content of “liberty” are systematically unreliable. The rule-consequentialist 
argument cannot easily be rejected in the abstract. On the one hand, it is easy to imagine 
a world in which the rule-consequentialist argument might be persuasively defended. On 
the other hand, it is doubtful that this world is our own. 
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